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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
GREEN V. STATE: OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
CONTAINED IN A SEXUAL ASSAULT FORENSIC
EXAMINER'S REPORT ARE TESTIMONIAL IN NATURE
AND INADMISSIBLE ABSENT THE DEFENDANT'S
OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE PERSON WHO
PREPARED THE REPORT.
By: Mahesh Subramanian
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that statements
contained within a sexual assault forensic examiner ("SAFE") nurse's
report, whether factual or otherwise, are inadmissible if the SAFE nurse
who prepared the report is unavailable to testify at trial. Green v. State,
199 Md. App. 386,22 A.3d 941 (2011). Further, the confrontation clause
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the opportunity
to cross-examine the person who prepared the report. Id at 411, 22 A.3d
at 956.
On January 6, 2008, Anthony Lafonte Green ("Green") arranged to
meet the victim, Ms. G., at an unoccupied home. Once there, the two
smoked marijuana and Green propositioned Ms. G. to have sexual
intercourse with him for $200. After she refused, Green pointed a gun at
her, made her take her clothes off, and forced her to perform oral sex on
him. After she complied, Green commanded Ms. G. to get on her hands
and knees as he held a knife to her rectum. After a fight, Ms. G. escaped
through a window and eventually told police that Green cut her legs with
a knife and stabbed her in the stomach. Two police officers accompanied
Ms. G. to the Washington Hospital Center, where she was examined and
eventually discharged. A third officer then arranged for Ms. G. to
undergo a separate examination by a SAFE nurse at Prince George's
Hospital.
At trial, the SAFE nurse was unavailable to testify so the trial court
admitted, over the defendant's objection, a redacted version of the results
of the SAFE nurse's report. The jury convicted Green of third and fourth
degree sexual offense, second degree assault, and reckless endangerment.
On appeal, Green argued to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was
violated when the trial court admitted the SAFE nurse's report because
she was unavailable to testify at trial.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland noted that the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment generally protects a
criminal defendant from the government's use of statements made outside
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the courtroom as evidence at trial without calling the witness to testify.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 399, 22 A.3d at 949 (citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004)). The court highlighted, however,
that "non-testimonial" out-of-court statements are admissible as an
exception to the general rule. Green, 199 Md. App. at 399, 22 A.3d at
949 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59). Although the Crawford Court did
not provide a definition of "testimonial," statements made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial do fall
within the "core class of testimonial statements" described in .Crawford.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 400,22 A.3d at 949.
Prior to its conclusion, the court emphasized the duties of a SAFE
nurse as set out in the Code of Maryland Regulations ("COMAR").
Green, 199 Md. App. at 401, 22 A.3d at 950 (citing MD. CODE REGs.
1O.27.21.04A (2011)). Some of the enumerated responsibilities include
gathering, preserving, and documenting forensic evidence in connection
with physical, sexual, or domestic assaults, maintaining the evidentiary
chain of custody, and testifying at trial. Green, 199 Md. App. at 401, 22
A.3d at 950 (citing MD. CODE REGs. 10.27.21.04A (2011)). The court
also highlighted the fact that prior to the SAFE nurse's examination, Ms.
G. underwent a physical examination at the Washington Hospital Center.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 401, 22 A.3d at 950. Furthermore, two police
officers testified that they specifically sought out the SAFE nurse and
asked her to examine the victim to collect evidence for the criminal
investigation. !d. at 402, 22 A.3d at 950-51.
Next, the court analyzed the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in State v. Snowden. Green, 199 Md. App. at 400, 22 A.3d at
949-50. In Snowden, the court determined that statements made to a
sexual abuse investigator by three alleged victims of child abuse were
testimonial within the definition supplied in Crawford. ld. (citing State v.
Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005)). The Snowden court
concluded that utilizing objective standards, an ordinary person in the
declarants' position would have anticipated that her statements to the
sexual abuse investigator would be used to prosecute the defendant.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 400,22 A.3d at 949 (citing Snowden, 385 Md. at
84-85, 867 A.2d at 326). Therefore, the victims' statements were
testimonial and could not be introduced at trial because defense counsel
did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarants. Green, 199
Md. App. at 400,22 A.3d at 949 (citing Snowden, 385 Md. at 84-85,867
A.2d at 326). The Green court held that similar to the statements made to
the sexual abuse investigator in Snowden, the statements in the SAFE
nurse's report were testimonial and therefore inadmissible absent the
defendant's opportunity to confront her at trial. Green, 199 Md. App. at
400, 22 A.3d at 950.
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The court further stated that the redacted version of the SAFE nurse's
report was not admissible under Maryland's business records exception to
the hearsay rule. Green, 199 Md. App. at 404, 22 A.3d at 952. To
support its decision, the court distinguished this case from Rollins v.
State. Id. at 403-04, 22 A.3d at 951-52. The court in Rollins held that
because autopsy reports are required by statute when a death occurs in an
unusual or suspicious manner, a redacted copy of an autopsy report is
admissible at trial if the author of the report is unavailable to testify.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 403-04, 22 A.3d at 951-52 (citing Rollins v.
State, 392 Md. 455, 897 A.2d 821 (2006)). Alternatively, SAFE nurse
reports are only prepared when the police suspect criminal sexual abuse.
Green, 199 Md. App. at 404, 22 A.3d at 951. Therefore, the court
concluded that a SAFE nurse is likely to reasonably believe that the
statements she makes in her report will be available for use at trial. Id. at
404, 22 A.3d at 952.
Even though the report contained routine, descriptive, and objectively
ascertained and reliable facts, the court held that redacting only the
testimonial portions of the report still denied Green the protections
afforded by the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Green, 199
Md. App. at 404, 22 A.3d at 952. Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Green court explained
that the protections of the confrontation clause provide that otherwise
reliable evidence should be assessed by "testing in the crucible of crossexamination." Id. at 409, 22 A.3d at 954-55 (citing Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009)). The court reasoned that
although a report may be reliable because it is generated during the
regular course of business, it does not qualify as a business record if its
essential purpose is for litigation. Green, 199 Md. App. at 404-05, 22
A.3d at 952 (citing Melendez, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943))). Accordingly, the court determined
that the statements in the SAFE report fell within the "core class" of outof-court statements described in Crawford and excluded from trial by the
confrontation clause. Green, 199 Md. App. at 411, 22 A.3d at 956. The
court ultimately held that the SAFE nurse's report was inadmissible as a
business record because the police sent Ms. G. to the Sexual Abuse
Center to help develop the State's criminal case. Id. at 406, 22 A.3d at
953.
In Green, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland extended the class
of inadmissible "testimonial" statements that the confrontation clause
excludes from trial. The court's holding maintains a criminal defendant's
constitutionally protected right to confront witnesses against him and
places the burden upon prosecutors to produce live witness testimony
subject to cross-examination at trial. This ruling makes explicit that even
the testimony of a co-worker or supervisor does not comport with the
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requirements of the confrontation clause if those individuals did not
prepare the report. The Green court's holding has the potential to cause
major ramifications in the ability of law enforcement to prosecute
criminal defendants in "cold cases" where the examining nurse or lab
technician no longer works in the same field, cannot be located, or is
deceased.

